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Abstract – This article deals with the challenge how to 
secure communication of constrained embedded devices 
via the Internet of Things protocols. The main focus is 
paid on a secure communication gateway, which is 
designed to enhance the security level of communication 
for constrained devices. The goal is to classify devices 
according to communication needs and associate needed 
measures (partitioning). The proposed gateway is 
focused on D2D and D2S application protocols. 
Validation of the proposed model was done for MQTT 
and CoAP protocols.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
If there is one key technology in context Industry 4 
4.0 that significantly contributed to the fast 
development of the IoT, it would be M2M protocols. 
This technology enables machines (manufacturing 
devices) to “talk” a common language, a language 
made of commands for actuators, and telemetry data 
from field sensors, which are the base any IoT system 
[1], [2], [3], [4]. Depending on the sector, term 
machine to indicate manufacturing devices (e.g. 
industrial robots, 3D printers), agricultural machines 
(e.g. soil sensors, irrigators), smart city devices (e.g. 
traffic lights, air quality monitors), and so on [5], [6]. 
New threats will emerge in exploiting M2M 
technology. In the long run, M2M communication will 
have a more direct impact on our lives. Automation 
systems running in factories and cities will take a 
decision based on collated telemetry data [7], [8], [9].  
IoT uses several applications protocols, which are 
designed for independent communication of smart 
embedded devices. 
Application protocols can be divided according to 
communication scope [10]. M2M (Machine to 
Machine) protocols are designed for independent 
communication of smart devices via 
“Publish/Subscribe” model, based on the concept of a 
“global data space” that is accessible to all interested 
applications.  All communication is represented as 
reads and writes to the global data space. Data flows 
directly from publishers (producers) to subscribers 
(consumers). M2S (Machine to Server) protocols are 
developed for the transport of collected data from 
devices to server infrastructure and vice versa via 
“Request/Response” protocol, that is typical for 
server/client architecture of Information systems (for 
instance, Web-based solutions - SOA). An example of 
complex IoT implementation is shown on Fig. 1, with 
selected application protocols according to Table I.  
Smart devices or embedded systems often use 
specialized processors, have very constrained memory 
and are equipped with limited powering capacity 
(battery). The biggest obstacle is the limited memory 
and the restricted processing power available in 
embedded systems. In order to withstand malevolent 
attacks, the end-to-end communication channels must 
be secured using cryptographically strong encryption 
and authentication algorithms [11], [12]. 
To address this issue and to provide feasible 
technology for encryption, the new LWC (Lightweight 
cryptography) methods are under development. 
Development of LWC block ciphers is based on 
modifications of existing block cipher from the area of 
conventional cryptography, such as DES (Feistel 
structure) or AES (permutation and substitution 
structure) [13], [14]. However, till the new algorithms 
are validated and commercially broadly used, the main 
challenge to secure communication of embedded 
devices via the Internet of Thing remains still. In 
addition, our focus is applications layer, which is 
mainly software based as protocols of lower layers L1-
L4 are highly standardized and part of embedded 
device hardware [15], [16], [17].  
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In the next chapter, we will focus on the fragility 
of IoT data backbone and will describe potential 
security attacks to be addressed by the proposed 
enhanced security model [18]. 
 
Figure 1.  IoT protocols and response time 
II. M2S APPLICATION PROTOCOLS OF IOT 
BACKBONE AND THEIR FRAGILITY 
M2S IoT application protocols are typically used 
for data backbone and collecting of device data from 
servers and information systems. The most used 
protocols in M2M technology are MQTT and CoAP 
that we can found in a variety of sectors including 
[11], [12].  
 
• MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) 
is a standard messaging protocol defined by 
ISO/IEC PRF 20922 standard [19]. It allows 
endpoints to exchange data in a publish-subscribe 
fashion. In MQTT, data exchange is mediated by 
one or more brokers. Clients can publish 
messages to thevbroker and/or subscribe to the 
broker to receive (certain) messages. All 
published messages must have a topic, which 
essentially a “label” of the particular message. 
Although there is no standard rule, topic is 
usually organized as a filling system (e.g. 
“station1/substation3/PLC3/temper
ature”) and are used to dispatch messages 
according to the right subscribers, depending on 
what topics they subcribed to [18], [20], [21]. 





Figure 2.  MQTT clients publish message to the broker, which 
takes care of dispatching them to the subsribers according to their 
topics [18] 
• CoAP (Constrained Application Protocol) is a 
client-server protocol, which means that the data 
exchange is initiated by a client node, with a 
request sent to a server node, which will answer 
with a response. It is a specialized web transfer 
protocol for use with constrained nodes and 
constrained (e.g., low-power, lossy) networks and 
is defined by RFC 7252 [22]. CoAP does not 
require the client to open or keep a connection to 
a server because it is based on UDP (User 
Datagram Protocol). At any time, a client can 
send one CoAP packet to a server. Each request 
has a few options, with the most important one 
being the URI (Uniform Resource Identifier, 
which indicates the “path” to the requested 
resource – much like URLs (Uniform Resource 
Locators) for websites. A node could be both 
server and client at the same time, implementing a 
point-to-point, full duplex data layer [11], [12], 
[18]. Example CoAP communication is illustrated 
by Fig. 3. 
 
Figure 3.  CoAP clients send a requests to the server, which 
responds to those that are correctly received [18] 
 
M2S communication is executed mainly via 
Internet, therefore we can expect several security 
issues, such as: 
• IP spoofing 
• Exposed credentials/Network configuration 
• Amplification attacks (BAF) 
• Over-the-Air Upgrades 
• Exposed MQTT/COAP endpoints 
• MQTT publishing of invalid UTF-8 data 
• Vulnerable MQTT Firmware Libraries 
 
In order to mitigate the mentioned issues, we can 
propose to use secure IoT gateway. The constrained 
devices are limited and cannot afford to use full scope 
encryption and apply complex authentication. 
Therefore, we have to secure M2S protocols by using 
of external device (secure IoT gateway), which can 
provide necessary encryption and authentication with 
using the standard protocols, such us IPSec/Ipv6 or 
TLS/SSL (TCP) to secure communication via Internet. 
The private network with constrained devices (M2M) 
will not be directly reachable from Internet and will 
have to use the gateway in order to enable 
communication with an external system.  It is a similar 
approach to computer networks (LAN) with using 
Firewalls that can be applied to divide network into 
two parts, the secured one behind a firewall and public 
network.  
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V.  MODEL OF IOT SECURE GATEWAY 
The essential idea is to use a dedicated external 
device, so called IoT Secure Gateway, for securing 
M2S communication of constrained devices via the 
Internet. The proposed model is shown on Fig. 4.  The 
devices are clustered according to their capabilities to 
3 partitions. Partition-I is assigned to devices, which 
are capable to communicate via CoAP protocol. 
Partition-II is dedicated for devices with the protocol 
MQTT, and finally Partition III for devices that do not 
support MQTT, neither CoAP (etc. DDS). 
  
 
Figure 4.  Proposed model for IIOT Secure Gateway  
The gateway handles the both protocols differently, 
CoAP is treated as a request/response protocol, 
therefore each device (N1i) can trigger request (x1j), 
which is translated by gateway to HTTP/REST 
protocol and secured with standard protocols SSL/TSL 
(Y1), as shown by Fig. 5. For external systems, the 
gateway can emulate virtual CoAP devices (N’1i) and 




Figure 5.  IoT secure gateway - CoAP/HTTP proxy (Y1) 
Numerical representation of proposed model for CoAP 
protocol can be expressed by following formulas: 
   
IPN’1i  ~ {IPY1,Port N2i},                          (1)    
         N’1i  ~  N1i,         (2) 
Y1i  ~  Fx ( N’1i, X1i),         (3)            
Y2  ~   Fy (T’1,T’2,…,T’z)                       (4) 
{T’1,T’2,…,T’z} ~ Fz {T1, T2,…, Tz}          (5)                  
where  
N1i - constrained devices with CoAP  
N2i - constrained devices with MQTT 
N3i - constrained devices without MQTT/CoAP 
N’1i - virtual IoT CoAP devices via Gateway 
X1i - CoAP request/replay message (POST/GET)  
X2j - MQTT consumer/produces message   
IPN’1i - socket address for virtual CoAP device   
Fy,x,y - gateway transformation functions 
   Gateway acts as a proxy device for CoAP protocol. 
It translates the IP addresses of constrained devices to 
socket addresses of gateway, as expressed by (1). In 
addition, the gateway maintains the association table 
between real devices (N1i) and virtual devices provided 
by gateway (N’1j), according to (2). CoAP messages 
are mapped with the using of the same methods to 
HTTP protocol of assigned virtual device, as 
expressed by (3). 
   MQTT protocol uses a different model. The gateway 
maintains two broker instances with the same topics 
that are mirrored. Constrained devices can work just 
with internal Broker_x, while public devices can use a 
different Broker_y (Fig. 6). The gateway has to handle 
all messages and map them into the both brokers 
according to defined rules (4)(5).  
 
            
Figure 6.  IoT secure gateway - MQTT/AMQP (Y2) 
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III. VALIDATION OF ENHANCED COMMUNICATION 
SECURITY 
The proposed model of IoT Secure gateway has 
been validated in our laboratory. The validation was 
performed with an experimental gateway for 
AMQP/MQTT protocol. The gateway was configured 
with two independent Brokers (Broker_Y, Broker_X) 
and simplified transformation function Fz  as expressed 
by (6), which leads to Y2 according to (7). 
{T’1,T’2, T’3,T’4,T’5} ~ Fz{ T1,T’2,0,0,0}              (6)  
Y2  ~ Fy{ 5,2,0,0,0}                                               (7)    
The transformation function is limited to a simple 
replication from Broker_X to Broker_Y (read 
permission for Broker_Y), or from an external network 
to Broker_X (write permission for Broker_Y). A 
simple MQTT client application was connected to the 
gateway and its Broker_X. The client was configured 
to publish numerical values to topics T1 and T3 and to 
perform consumption of value in topic T2.  The both 
initial screens, IoT gateway and MQTT client, are 





Figure 7.   
Figure 8.   
Figure 9.   
Figure 10.   
Figure 11.   
Figure 7.  Testing of IoT secure gateway via MQTT simple client 
application 
After publishing of values to both topics by MQTT 
client, IoT gateway replicated value from topic T1 to 
T’1 on Broker_Y. Topic value T3 was not replicated 
and remained just in Broker_X, based on 
transformation function setting (no read). In addition, 
MQTT client application consumed value from topic 
T2 that was written from Broker_Y to Broker_X. That 
value was published from the external system via 
Cloud. Both screens of IoT gateway and the client can 











Figure 8.  Result of testing of  IoT Secure gateway 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As explained, IoT security features are not strong 
enough, mainly due to lack of encryption power in 
constrained devices and embedded systems. Till the 
new algorithms are made available, there is a need to 
secure communication by other means.  
Therefore an alternative approach is proposed to use 
the additional device, IoT Secure gateway, to secure 
communication of constrained devices with external 
systems and servers via Cloud. The secure gateway 
offers full scope security measures including 
encryption on network and transport layer (IPSec, 
TSL/SSL) for external communication (M2S). The 
constrained devices cannot afford the same level of 
security measures, therefore they have to be hidden 
behind the gateway. The gateway acts as a proxy 
device for CoAP protocol and emulates virtual devices 
which are independent on real physical infrastructure. 
The different approach was proposed for MQTT 
communication. It is based on two mirrored Brokers, 
which can isolate external and internal 
communication. In addition, the mirroring of MQTT 
topics can be controlled by transformation function. 
The gateway functions were validated by test cases 
with MQTT communication. The test results have 
confirmed expected capabilities, such as a physical 
separation of constrained devices from external 
systems and proper gateway transformation functions.  
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methods of management of industrial processes based 
on the concept of Industry 4.0.  
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